OF ALL THE THINGS that could easily anticipated in Iraq, the idea that an oppressed Shia majority might seek revenge on the previously ruling Sunni minority must be at the top of the list. In the cobbled polyglot of nuanced cultures in the land that was Mesopotamia and Babylon, the cry for revenge could and should have been planned for by occupation forces in the babble where the Shia would no longer brook its opposition. But Major General William G. Webster Jr., commander of the Third Infantry Division, that conducted the raid on the now infamous torture center at Iraq’s Interior Ministry could not hear the one cry for torture and revenge there, because it was part of a rising rabbling chorus of so many other rumors of revenge. [story]American forces, he said, had heard the stories of secret prisons and torture, many of them telephoned to hotlines set up last year for tips in the hunt for insurgents. The center, in Jadriya, he said, was "notorious" before the raid was triggered by a mother's appeal for help in finding her 15-year-old son. So why wasn't it raided sooner? Because, the general said in so many words, Iraq is so washed by rumor, and fact is so elusive, that the 153,000 American troops here have simply been overwhelmed.
IT BEGS THE CONSCIENCE and credulity to say we can not hear the specific cry when the general problem could have and should have been known and planned for long ago. What more priority could there be than protecting Iraqis from the horror they would inflict on each other? The problem is protecting Sunni from Shia doesn’t fit in with the American view of outside “terrorists” coming in to foment all form of opposition to America lighting the fire of freedom for all to see. We are blind to the cover of darkness we have further pulled across the land. Our fire of freedom has so nobly brought smoke in our eyes.
As an example of the obscurities that have enveloped the American enterprise here, the general cited the difficulty the Americans have in distinguishing between the 320,000 members of the Iraqi Army and the police, and the thousands of other armed irregulars now stalking the land. Some of these irregulars, he said, were members of Kurdish and Shiite militias; some, private security forces recruited by ministers; still others, bodyguards to other prominent Iraqis. Along with these, he said there are Sunni insurgents and other killers and kidnappers who steal uniforms and unit badges and masquerade as army and police commandos. In Baghdad alone, he said, three truckloads of uniforms have been hijacked in recent weeks.
WHO ARE WE fighting and what are we fighting for? What is the mission and what will be accomplished? Some see it as our duty [Andrew Sullivan]
One thing I wish were more insisted upon. It's not just that we have no interest in seeing Iraq degenerate into a brutal civil and possibly regional war. By removing Saddam, we created this vacuum. We own it. We have a moral responsibility to see this through.
THE PRESUMPTION that we know best may be the greatest sign of our myopia. What if “the mission” we fight for does not remove what is the scourge of the Iraqis? The idea that we “own” anything in Iraq might come as a surprise to the native population. More fire, more smoke in the eyes.
MORE VOICES AMIDST THE SOUND AND THE FURY
[The Reaction] . . .the consequences of not finishing the job could turn out to be even worse than the gross injustices of this war.THE HERETIK NOTES the problem isn't going to go away, but the idea that we own anything in Iraq must go away if there is to be any effective solution. If withdrawal of a stabilizing outside force is viewed by some as leading to chaos and if the Iraqis view the United States as but a competing invading tribe, perhaps the time has come for the United States to find some strength in admitting its weakness before the problem and before the world.
IF WE TRULY SEEK what is best for the Iraqi people and for the world, doing the hard thing and seeking a true coalition of nations to stabilize the area would be a start. The time of rhetoric must end and a sight of clear reality must rise. But that would mean George Bush would have to go to the United Nations and what is the probability of that?
I do agree, Heretik. I think that the job must be finished, but I suspect that the only way for that to happen will be for the U.S. to work in conjunction with the U.N., even to hand over responsibility to the U.N. But will that happen? Does the U.N. want anything to do with Iraq?
Posted by: Michael J.W. Stickings | November 21, 2005 at 03:12 PM
And how would Bolton approach that um mission, MJWS? How much worse do things have to get before people put down their illusions and deal with reality?
Posted by: The Heretik | November 21, 2005 at 03:34 PM